Dr. Rahim JAVADBEYLİ (JAVADPOUR)
DOI 10.64259/IRANUS
ISSN 2819-4047 - ISSN 2819-4055
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Since the early 20th century, the dynamics of Iran–U.S. relations have fluctuated between cooperation and conflict. This can be summarized as follows:
- Historical Background and Key Turning Points
The origins of Iran–U.S. diplomatic relations can be traced back to the 1850s, with official ties established on June 11, 1883, when Samuel Greene Wheeler Benjamin (1837–1914) presented his letter of credence to Naser al-Din Shah. Initially marked by cordial relations and a spirit of alliance, this period gradually transformed into a relationship of antagonism due to ideological, political, and economic developments.
A significant turning point occurred in 1911, when the Iranian government invited William Morgan Shuster to reform the country’s financial administration. His six-month mission was welcomed by the Iranian public and certain segments of the political elite, reinforcing the perception of the United States as a counterbalance to British and Russian imperial influence. However, this perception deteriorated due to the U.S. role in suppressing the Autonomous Government of Azerbaijan in 1945 and its involvement in the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had envisioned a modern revival of the Qajar Turkish state.
The U.S.-backed coup, which led to Mossadegh’s removal from office, deeply undermined Iranian trust in the United States. The 1979 Islamic Revolution marked a decisive rupture in bilateral relations. Following the revolution, Iran severed diplomatic ties with the United States and began referring to it as the "Great Satan." The seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran later that year, along with the ensuing hostage crisis, further intensified the animosity between the two nations.
It is essential to fully understand the underlying reasons behind the mistrust and skepticism of the Turks—who constitute the foundational ethnic component of Iran—toward Western powers, particularly the United States. Without a proper understanding of these reasons, it is impossible to grasp the sociopolitical and sociopsychological causes of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the subsequent developments.
In brief, the causes can be summarized as follows: the famine and massacres imposed on Iran between 1917 and 1921, which resulted in the loss of nearly half of the country’s population; the coup of February 21, 1921, which led to the fall of the Qajar Turkic state; the establishment of the anti-Turkic Pahlavi regime in 1925; the destruction of the National Government in Tabriz in 1945; and the overthrow of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who had aimed to restore the Qajar legacy in a modern form. In all of these critical events, the United Kingdom and the United States played central roles, which fostered deep-rooted distrust among the Turkic population of Iran.
Over time, this mistrust was further exacerbated by the manipulation of the U.S. factor by anti-Turkic networks aligned with Persian nationalist ideology, particularly as Turkish-speaking and Persian-speaking Turks—whether religious, secular, or regionally oriented Azerbaijani nationalists—found themselves at odds with U.S. policies. These networks, which operated in favor of the Persian-centric mindset, sought to expand their influence within the country by aligning themselves with the U.S., the U.K., and other Western powers against the Turks, the country's primary founding element.
Indeed, over the past century, Iran’s relations with the United States and the United Kingdom have largely been managed and controlled by factions loyal to the Persian ideological framework. As a result, these groups have aimed to utilize the influence of the U.S. and the U.K. as political tools against Iran’s Turkic population. This, in turn, has naturally led to a cautious and distant stance by Iranian Turks—whether religious, secular, or regionally oriented Azerbaijani nationalists—toward both countries.
This dynamic continues to the present day. If the existing problems in Iran–U.S. relations are to be resolved, and if meaningful and mutually beneficial cooperation is to be established, then the influence of Persian-aligned groups, institutions, and entities within the framework of bilateral dialogue must be eliminated.
If the United States seeks to establish a genuine strategic partnership with Iran, it is imperative that it does not ignore the Turkic population, the original and foundational component of the country, and instead engages with them as a legitimate and essential party. In short, the U.S. and the U.K. must refrain from allowing themselves to be instrumentalized by Persian-centered ideological factions. It is time to put a stop to such dynamics.
To conclude this discussion, it is fitting to present a brief example that encapsulates the situation well: Martyr Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani (1879–1920), one of Iran’s most prominent political figures and ideological leaders during the First World War era, was the husband of the paternal aunt of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. From a young age, Seyyed Ali was raised on stories of Khiabani’s heroism, resistance, struggle, martyrdom, and the circumstances and perpetrators behind his assassination. His worldview was shaped and matured within such an environment.
It should not be forgotten that political struggles in Iran are often grounded in deeply rooted historical narratives—they could, in many ways, be described as conflicts of inherited legends and interpretations.
Dozens of our published studies on Iranian Turkic identity may be consulted for further reference.
Martyr Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani (1879–1920)
- The Post–Cold War Era and Regional Dynamics
The end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new phase in Iran–U.S. relations. During the 1990s, the United States adopted a "Dual Containment" policy aimed at curbing Iran’s regional influence. In response, Iran intensified its anti-Israel rhetoric and extended support to various Islamic groups across the region. During this period, Iran’s nuclear program also came to the forefront, attracting heightened international scrutiny and emerging as a new source of tension between Iran and the United States.
- The Nuclear Agreement and Its Aftermath
In 2015, Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with the P5+1 countries, agreeing to limit its nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. However, in 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement, leading to a renewed escalation of tensions.
Those interested in the Iran–P5+1 agreement may refer to our work titled "The Iran–P5+1 Agreement: A Path Toward Civil War?"
Following the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran accelerated its nuclear activities and adopted a more assertive, more determined, and harsher regional policy.
- Current Strategic Orientations
Three fundamental strategic orientations shaping Iran’s foreign policy have been identified:
- Pivot to the East:
Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, opposes the strategic presence of the United States and the United Kingdom in the region and aims to weaken it. The goal is to create a strategic divide between these two countries, compelling them to engage in separate negotiations with Iran. The Supreme Leader does not advocate severing relations with either the U.S. or the U.K.; on the contrary, he prefers to reach high-level separate agreements with both nations individually. To pressure the United States into this position, Iran has successfully elevated its relations with the East to the level of a strategic alliance.
This vision has been concretized through three significant alliance strategies:
The first is the establishment of a strategic alliance with the People’s Republic of China. This agreement was signed on March 27, 2021, in Tehran as the “25-Year Strategic Partnership Agreement” by the foreign ministers of the two countries, Mohammad Javad Zarif and Wang Yi.
The second is a similar strategic partnership with Russia. This agreement was signed on January 17, 2025, in Moscow as the “Iran–Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement” by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (Tabiboglu) and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The third concept, although not official in Iran’s political discourse, is the emerging vision of a “Turkic Union including Iran.” This concept and political rhetoric advocate for Iran’s formal membership in the Organization of Turkic States and its serious and active contribution to the establishment of a large, strong, and prosperous Turkic Union.
The intellectual and political architect of the strategic alliance agreements with China and Russia is directly Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei. The third concept was theoretically developed over many years by Dr. Rahim Javadbeyli and was brought seriously to political discourse primarily in Iran and across the Turkic World in 2019. Although this concept and political discourse have been seriously accepted by influential circles in Iran and the Turkic World, due to some external interventions, this revolutionary process, which had just begun, was shelved and undermined in 2021. Despite these adverse attitudes and approaches, this political discourse continues to gain importance daily and awaits serious consideration by the Turkic States.
- Axis of Resistance:
Since the 1990s, and particularly from 2003 onwards, Iran has actively pursued a state policy of supporting various Islamic militia groups across West Asia. This strategy has been an integral part of Iran’s efforts to expand its regional influence and sustain its geopolitical power. In essence, Iran has intertwined its own state’s future with that of these Islamic militia groups.
- Asymmetric Warfare and Technological Investments:
Iran has made significant investments in missile technology, cyber warfare capabilities, and other asymmetric military assets. The objective is to enhance its strategic deterrence and compensate for weaknesses in conventional military domains. However, the war that began on October 7, 2023, with Hamas militants’ attack on Israel, followed by changes in control in the Gaza Strip, Lebanon, and subsequently Syria, has severely shaken the Axis of Resistance.
- Regional Alliances:
During the presidency of Seyyed Ebrahim Raisolsadati, commonly known as Ebrahim Raisi (December 14, 1960 – May 19, 2024), who served from August 5, 2021, to May 19, 2024, Iran made significant advances in Eurasian integration. On September 17, 2021, Iran joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and in 2023 (officially as of January 1, 2024), it became a full member of BRICS. Accordingly, Iran has substantially strengthened its relations with China, Russia, Turkic states, and other regional countries, particularly members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS.
The process was, so to speak, disrupted by the fatal helicopter crash on May 19, 2024, which claimed the life of President Ebrahim Raisi. As I have discussed in other interviews, the helicopter crash—which also resulted in the deaths of Tabriz’s Imam Jumu'ah Ayatollah Al-Hashim and other senior state officials—was not an ordinary accident but a direct act of terrorism. However, for various reasons, Iran has deemed it unsuitable to pursue the matter aggressively.
One of the significant reasons behind this restraint has been an internal dilemma within the system; since its establishment, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been plagued by such an internal conflict and has yet to overcome it. This remains one of its greatest challenges. Nevertheless, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, has chosen to take control of this dilemma—now transformed into a critical issue—and use it as an extraordinary golden opportunity for Iran’s future.
It should be noted that, in both the strategic partnership agreements signed with the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, Iran has deliberately avoided fully intertwining its state’s survival with either Russia or China. A careful examination of these agreements and mutual relations reveals that Iran has preferred to maintain a certain distance, not fully committing its state’s future to either power. This prudent stance has skillfully kept the door open for a serious alliance agreement contemplated with the United States.
Following Ebrahim Raisi’s presidency, with the election of Masoud Pezeshkian (Tabiboglu), a member of Iran’s Turkics, as president, a renewed negotiation process with the United States was initiated through reformist channels. The bilateral talks took place in Muscat and Rome, mediated by the Sultanate of Oman. On the brink of the sixth session of these negotiations, scheduled to be held in Muscat on June 13, Iran was officially attacked by Israel, leading to the outbreak of the 13–24 June 2025 war. The 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel was intense and exhausting for both parties.
Although acting against his own will, U.S. President Donald Trump openly sided with Israel—long considered untouchable for seventy years but severely targeted and devastated by Iranian missiles—and in the early hours of Sunday, June 22, ordered B2 bombers to strike Iran’s Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear facilities. One day after the attack, on the evening of June 23, Donald Trump announced that Israel and Iran had agreed on a ceasefire that could lead to lasting peace. Although temporary, a ceasefire between Iran and Israel was thus secured once again through Donald Trump’s mediation.
The clear and critical point to be understood here is the reality that Iran, lacking nuclear deterrence, stands alone against two of the world’s greatest nuclear powers—Iran’s adversaries Israel and the United States. This reflects, as previously noted, Iran’s reluctance to share all its political and military cards with Russia and China on a global scale, coupled with its persistent aim to reach an agreement with the U.S.
According to unverified data, Iran has reportedly spent over two trillion dollars independently acquiring knowledge, expertise, nuclear technology, and nuclear facilities related to nuclear energy. Interestingly, had Iran wished to fully merge its state survival and future with Russia or China—signing alliance treaties at a level that would imply "an attack on Iran is an attack on Russia and vice versa" or "an attack on Iran is an attack on China and vice versa"—it would have likely obtained not only peaceful nuclear energy but possibly nuclear weapons as well, without suffering such losses.
However, it can now be stated clearly that Iran does not possess nuclear weapons but has developed advanced expertise and technology in peaceful nuclear energy through its own knowledge and efforts. This scientific and technological progress enables Iran to make revolutionary advances in many fields, including electricity generation, medicine, industry, defense, and healthcare.
Iran’s possession of such peaceful nuclear technology and facilities will be highly beneficial for regional countries, especially Turkic and Islamic states. Notably, this development represents a first in the Turkic and Islamic world: whereas Pakistan’s and Kazakhstan’s nuclear facilities are imported rather than indigenous, all scientific and technological stages related to nuclear atomic energy in Iran have been developed by local engineers and specialists. In other words, the knowledge, expertise, and technologies regarding nuclear atomic energy have been locally created and advanced.
This can truly be described as an industrial revolution for the Turkic and Islamic worlds.
During the 12-day Iran–Israel war, while conversing with a distinguished statesman at the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), I witnessed how objective and accurate my previous assertions were. He spoke about his discussions with the leading engineers and specialists who have played a key role in the field of nuclear energy—a sector that has been followed with increasing seriousness in Turkey since the era of the late Turgut Özal.
According to the latest assessments from Turkey’s foremost nuclear engineers and experts, it is emphasized that Iran does not possess a nuclear atomic bomb—in other words, it lacks nuclear deterrence—but has achieved significant scientific and technological accomplishments in nuclear energy.
Our esteemed statesman stated:
“These scientific and technological achievements attained by Iran represent a first for the Turkic and Islamic worlds. This is considered a great achievement even within Turkey itself. It marks an extraordinary development that enables the Turkic and Islamic worlds to move beyond assembly-based industries and become owners of core industries. We must unite hand in hand, shoulder to shoulder, and strengthen together. The targeting of Iran is not due to a desire to produce an atomic bomb, but rather because of these scientific and technological advancements. Such progress is intolerable to some.”
It is true that Iran has neither produced nor sought to produce an atomic bomb and does not possess nuclear weapons deterrence; however, it has made serious scientific and technological progress in nuclear energy.
The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, and the team of U.S. President Donald Trump are managing an extremely critical period for our world. Their decisions and authority will directly affect hundreds of millions of people and, indirectly, the future of billions. Accordingly, they bear a tremendous responsibility to act with utmost prudence.
It is well understood that Iran–U.S. relations possess an extremely complex and multilayered nature, shaped by ideological differences, regional rivalries, and strategic miscalculations. Despite ongoing mistrust and tensions, both countries have compelling reasons to keep diplomatic channels open. Constructive dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms are not only vital for the stability of bilateral relations but also essential for regional and global peace.
Conclusion and Proposal
It must first be acknowledged by Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, that due to Iran’s geopolitical position, it is essential and inevitable to implement the necessary civil, social, and political reforms aimed primarily at defining a modern nation-state identity and shaping state strategy accordingly.
The strategy imposed and constructed based on the “Umm al-Qura” theory, advanced since the early 1980s through the words of Mohammad Javad Ardashir Larijani— anti Turkic Ottomanist mission —has created a disastrous deadlock for Iran and the entire region. The Farsism (Persian Thought System) theorized by the Baghdadi Jew Mohammad Ali Foroughi (1877–1942), along with the aforementioned “Umm al-Qura” theory promoted by Larijani, must be officially renounced by the state.
Resistance against rampant Zionism is a just cause and should be supported by all conscientious peoples and nations. However, before confronting Zionism located 1,500 km away, Iran must first wage war against the Zionism that has been internally constructed, accumulated, strengthened, and terrifyingly entrenched in every sphere— The Pharisees sect of Jewish origin. This Pharisees /Farisiye sect has spiritually seized the country through the Persian Thought System imposed in the modern nation-state framework and is driving the nation as a whole toward a precipice.
It must be officially recognized that Iran’s original founding element is the Turkic-Tat people. Legal procedures must be undertaken to make the Turkish language, alongside Persian, an official, legal, and mandatory state language. The cultural and political rights of regional and local communities such as the Lurs, Laris, Laks, Gilaks, Kurmanjis, Guranis, Suranis, Kelhurs, Arabs, Balochs, and others must be protected by law. Arbitrary interference with women’s attire, head-to-toe, must cease, and individual rights and freedoms should be fully recognized.
His Majesty King Charles III of the United Kingdom and the other 14 Commonwealth realms, Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and especially U.S. President Donald Trump must never forget one thing: Iran has successfully nationalized and localized its nuclear energy technology and facilities based on indigenous knowledge and expertise. These are not imported technologies but homegrown achievements—revolutionary scientific accomplishments that must be acknowledged. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure could not be destroyed by bombing or terrorist acts.
Secondly, the groups, institutions, and organizations that disregard Iran’s original founding element—the Turks—and operate through the Persian Thought System must be unequivocally stopped. Iran must be recognized as the nation of Iranians, as it has been historically, and the imposition of identities must cease.
For a long time, various initiatives have been proposed to establish foundational dialogues with the United States, improve relations, and form serious and solid collaborations across broad areas; however, these attempts have not succeeded. The fundamental reason for this failure, as mentioned above, has been the initiation and conduct of these processes through groups, institutions, and organizations that prefer to ignore the existing will of the Iranian Turkic population, particularly its conservative segments.
For instance, the process conducted through the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) alone constitutes a dead end. NIAC and similar organizations categorically deny the country’s original founding element—the Turks—and adopt a hostile stance against them. They even consider the core element of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s hard power as a target to be eliminated under the guise of reform, using the U.S. and other NATO members as instruments in this strategy.
In an environment nourished and dominated by such mistrust, resentment, and hatred, meaningful dialogue is nothing but a waste of time. Indeed, expecting a productive mechanism from the secretive processes led by NIAC and similar organizations is unrealistic. This approach only serves to further escalate tensions in Iran–U.S. relations.
What Needs to Be Done?
Without disregarding the Turkic people who constitute Iran’s original founding element, and by taking into account the legitimate demands of the conservative faction—primarily composed of Turks—that forms the core of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s hard power, it is possible to initiate a reasonable and acceptable new process through Turkey. This process aims to resolve issues in Iran–U.S. bilateral relations, establish serious dialogues in a solid environment, and organize substantial cooperation in necessary fields.
The dialogue process initiated through Turkey promises significant strategic alliance opportunities, primarily for the United States and Western countries, to reach agreements with Iran.
This envisions an Iran that officially renounces Mohammad Ali Foroughi’s The Pharisees sect (Persian Thought System) and Mohammad Javad Ardashir Larijani’s “Umm al-Qura” theory (anti-Turkic Ottomanist mission), respects the rights and laws of all local and regional minorities on an equal, horizontal basis, embraces individual rights and freedoms, and implements the necessary reforms in this regard, while reclaiming its historical mission toward the Turkic world.
In other words, as a fundamental strategy, a strong, large, and prosperous Turkic Union centered on the alliance between Iran and Turkey—positioned in the central corridor of the Turkic world in Asia, within the triangle formed by the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and India—can be considered the key BALANCE element on the geopolitical table.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the Turkish, Azerbaijani Turkish, and Persian versions of this study were published on 3 July 2025. The English version, however, despite being submitted to several prominent strategic centers and think tanks in the United Kingdom and the United States, was not published for a variety of reasons. Under the current circumstances, following the death of Supreme Leader Seyyed Ali Khamenei, it appears that Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei, as the newly selected Supreme Leader, is likely to continue operating within the framework of the state's existing strategic orientation. In this context, the establishment of closer strategic relations and cooperation with the United Kingdom and, in particular, the United States may be anticipated. A new Iran, whose historical and political foundations include Turks as one of its principal founding components and which is increasingly open to engagement with the West, possesses the potential to become a key strategic partner for both the United States and the United Kingdom in the formation of a prosperous, powerful, and integrated Turkic sphere. From this perspective, the revitalization of Turkish identity and influence within Iran may coincide with certain geopolitical and strategic interests of both Britain and the United States in Asia. An Iran that revitalizes and reclaims its Turkish identity could become a strong ally of the United States and the United Kingdom.
Core Unity According to the Khorasan/Azerbaijan Civilization Basin Doctrine; Map of the Turkic Union Alongside Iran
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